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Introduction 
Managerial discretion is the latitude of action afforded to a manager. This literature, classically focused 
at the executive level, reconciles population ecology’s assertion that executives ultimately have little 
influence over firm-level outcomes and strategic choice theory’s assertion that executives make 
strategic decisions and thus have considerable influence over firm-level outcomes. Though generally 
viewed in the management literature as an opportunity for executives to positively affect performance 
and increase value, the literature in finance and economics argues that managerial discretion 
represents a cost to shareholders from potential opportunism or other self-serving behaviors. Within 
the management literature, scholars posit three categories (i.e., forces) that constrain or enable 
executives: (1) the task environment (i.e., industry-level factors), (2) the internal organization (i.e., 
firm-level factors), and (3) managerial characteristics (i.e., individual-level factors). Recently, a fourth 
category, national institutions (i.e., country-level factors), was added to the managerial discretion 
model. While the managerial discretion literature has typically focused on upper echelons, scholars are 
increasing their examination of mid-level managers’ discretion since many of the construct’s enabling 
and constraining factors are also relevant for managers who are subordinate to senior executives. The 
potential for issue selling and strategic planning activities by mid-level managers to influence 
executives’ perceived discretion is an example of phenomena studied by scholars attempting to 
improve our understanding of discretion afforded to mid-level managers. 
Historical and Theoretical Foundation 
While Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987 developed the seminal managerial discretion model employed by 
management scholars, the concept was considered by management theorists for many years prior to 
their model’s publication. March and Simon 1958 argued that executives engage in rational human 
choice and that, because of executives’ limited cognitive capacities relative to the complexities of the 
problems faced by individuals and organizations, simplifying processes are required to capture the 
main features of problems facing their organizations. Additionally, executives’ bounded rationality and 
aspiration levels, combined with implications of organizations existing as social institutions, influence 
executives’ decisions and their organizations’ actions. Thompson 1967 argues that executives may be 
constrained by powerful external forces, narrowing the range of options they can legitimately pursue, 
while Pfeffer 1977 argues that executive behavior is subject to pressures to conform to the 
expectations of peers, subordinates, and superiors. These works laid the foundation for the managerial 
discretion model and its primary argument—that executive decision-making is enabled and 
constrained by a variety of forces. Thus, Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987 posits that managerial 
discretion acts as a conduit between two opposing organizational theories: population ecology and 
strategic choice. Supporting population ecology, Hannan and Freeman 1977 contends that 
organizations are inertial and are limited by internal and external pressures. Executives are constrained 
by organizational rigidities, including nontransferable assets, sunk costs, firm age and history, and 
power dynamics. Hannan and Freeman 1984 expands on this position by arguing that firms are 
structurally inertial because of isomorphic adaptation to their environment. Population ecologists 
conclude that executives matter very little, since it is rare that they succeed in making substantial 
strategic or structural changes. Child 1972, however, argues that managers have agency and choose 
strategies that shape organizational outcomes. Scholars such as Child, who support the strategic choice 
perspective, argue that executives matter a great deal because they determine long-term goals and 
objectives and can initiate courses of action (e.g., strategic change, diversification, acquisitions, and 
divestitures) to pursue their organizations’ missions and objectives. Extending this logic to the 
environment in which firms operate, strategic choice theory suggests that decisions are made through 
internal and external relationships and involve pro-action as well as reaction. Indeed, Child 
1972 postulates that executives, as well as others within a dominant coalition, can make a “strategic 
choice” to implement structural change, determine the industry or market segment where their firms 
compete, and alter performance standards. 
 
Child, J. “Organizational Structure, Environment and Performance: The Role of Strategic 
Choice.” Sociology 6. 1 (1972): 1–22. 
Theorizes the role of strategic choice within the organization. Executives, as part of the dominant 
coalition, can choose activities to improve operational effectiveness and favorable 
environments for distributing goods and services. Furthermore, demand for goods and services 
is created by the dominant coalition’s ability to integrate activities associated with operational 
effectiveness and market efficiency. 
Hambrick, D. C., and Sydney Finkelstein. “Managerial Discretion: A Bridge between Polar Views of 
Organizational Outcomes.” Research in Organizational Behavior 9 (1987): 369–406. 
The seminal article on managerial discretion. Integrates the opposing views that executives minimally 
impact firms (i.e., population ecology theory) and that executives substantially impact firms 
(i.e., strategic choice theory). Establishes three forces (task environment, internal organization, 
and managerial characteristics) that enable or constrain discretion. Provides an eight-category 
typology of discretion in which executives have greater and reduced effectiveness due to 
enabling and constraining factors. 
Hannan, M. T., and John Freeman. “The Population Ecology of Organizations.” American Journal of 
Sociology 82. 5 (1977): 929–964. 
Organizational forms are isomorphic in that they operate within the same environment and attempt to 
adapt toward the optimal organizational form. Isomorphism occurs because nonoptimal forms 
are selected out or organizational decision-makers make adjustments based on learned optimal 
responses. Competitive mechanisms are a major determinant of organizational form, as 
competitive processes involve trying to attain limiting resources, contesting for geographic or 
functional territories, and increased similarity from repetitive responses. 
Hannan, M. T., and John Freeman. “Structural Inertia and Organizational Change.” American 
Sociological Review 49.2 (1984): 149–164. 
Clarifies the meaning of structural inertia within population ecology theory. Structural inertia is an 
outcome of the selection process and increases with firm age and size. Complexity further 
increases structural inertia due to the risk and length of time associated with reorientation. 
March, J. G., and Herbert Simon. Organizations. Oxford: Wiley, 1958. 
Establishes modern organizational theory. Among their many propositions, the authors apply the term 
“bounded rationality” to describe executives’ limited comprehension of all information related 
to most decisions. Executives attempt to overcome their limitations by employing simplifying 
processes that capture the main features of problems facing their organizations. Mature and 
previously successful organizations rely excessively on established methods and are further 
limited by powerful internal stakeholders. 
Pfeffer, J. “The Ambiguity of Leadership.” Academy of Management Review 2.1 (1977): 104–112. 
An intriguing article that raises doubts about leadership in organizations. Pfeffer argues that it is 
questionable whether leadership affects organizational performance and that leader selection 
often involves irrelevant criteria. Pfeffer further asserts that leaders may have minimal effect 
because of homogeneity of acceptable leadership styles, constraints on discretion and 
behavior, and their ability to influence only a few aspects of organizational performance. 
Thompson, J. D. Organizations in Action: Social Science Bases of Administrative Theory. New York: 
Routledge, 1967. 
Extends previous theory by arguing that, during uncertainty, organizations’ behavior and actions vary 
based on resources (specifically, technologies) and the organizations’ task environments. One 
of Thompson’s many arguments is that executives are constrained by powerful external forces 
and subsequently have a limited set of actions that they can pursue while retaining legitimacy. 
 
 
 
